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I want your money 我要用的就是你的钱
Sep 25th 2008
From The Economist print edition
No government bail-out of the banking system was ever going to be pretty. This one deserves support
政府对银行系统的救助永远不可能完美，但当下的这个理应得到支持。
SAVING the world is a thankless task. The only thing beyond dispute in the $700 billion plan of Hank Paulson, the treasury secretary, and Ben Bernanke, chairman of the Federal Reserve, to stem the financial crisis is that everyone can find something in it to dislike. The left accuses it of ripping off taxpayers to save Wall Street, the right damns it as socialism; economists disparage its technicalities, political scientists its sweeping powers. The administration gave ground to Congress, George Bush delivered a televised appeal and Barack Obama and John McCain suspended the presidential campaign. Even so, as The Economist went to press, the differences remained. There was a chance that Congress would say no.
拯救世界是一个费力不讨好的任务。财长鲍尔森和联储主席伯南克为了阻止金融危机而主张了7000亿美元救助计划，其中只有一点是毋庸置疑的：每个人都能从该计划中挑出些毛病来（不可能让每个人都满意—）。左翼势力控诉该计划无异于抢劫纳税人的钱财去救助华尔街，右翼势力谴责该计划为社会主义运动；经济学家鄙视计划的学术性，政治科学家崇拜它横扫一切的强大威力。执政当局向国会进行了妥协：布什发出了电视呼吁，奥巴马和麦凯恩也暂停了竞选大战。即使如此，经济学人杂志在付印时分歧仍在（还是保留了异见）。国会曾经是有机会拒绝该计划的。
Spending a sum of money that could buy you a war in Iraq should not come easily; and the notion of any bail-out is deeply troubling to any self-respecting capitalist. Against that stand two overriding arguments. First this is a plan that could work (see article). And, second, the potential costs of producing nothing, or too little too slowly, include a financial collapse and a deep recession spilling across the world: those far outweigh any plausible estimate of the bail-out’s cost.
花掉相当于伊战军费规模的一大笔银子不应该如此轻松，况且救助的理念令任何一个有自尊心的资本家都感到非常不安。但针对上述论调有两大主要反对观点：第 一，这是一个可能行之有效的方案；第二，那些毫无效果或者收效甚微的潜在支出已经大大超过了救援计划合理的成本预测，上述支出包括蔓延全球的金融崩溃和经 济萎缩所招致的损失。
Mr Market goes to Congress
让国会来判决市场
America’s financial system has two ailments: it owns a huge amount of toxic securities linked to falling house prices. And it is burdened by losses that leave it short of capital (although the world has capital, not enough has been available to the banks). For over a year, since August 2007, central bankers, principally Mr Bernanke, have been trying to make this toxic debt liquid. But by September 17th, following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and the nationalisation of American International Group earlier that week, the problem started to become one of the system’s solvency too. The market lost faith in a strategy that saved finance one institution at a time. The economy is not healing itself. If credit markets stay blocked, consumers and firms will enter a vicious spiral.
美国金融体系微恙有二：过量持有与狂跌房价相关的有毒债券；损失的负担致使体系内呈现出资本短缺（尽管全球拥有很多资本，但是银行可用部分确严重不足）。 自2007年8月以来的一年时间里，以伯南克为主要代表的央行一直致力于有毒债务的清偿。但截止到9月17日，紧随雷曼兄弟的破产和美国国际集团的国有 化，该难题发展成了金融体系清偿能力的麻烦之一。市场对于采取逐个机构救助的方法来挽救金融体系的策略已经失去了信心，美国经济不可能实现自救。如果信贷 市场依然一片僵局，消费者和公司必将卷入更为凶残的漩涡。
Mr Paulson’s plan relies on buying vast amounts of toxic securities. The theory is that in any auction a huge buyer like the federal government would end up paying more than today’s prices, temporarily depressed by the scarcity of buyers, and still buy the loans cheaply enough to reflect the high chance of a default. That would help recapitalise some banks—which could also set less capital aside against a cleaner balance sheet. And by creating credible, transparent prices, it would at last encourage investors to come in and repair the financial system: this week Warren Buffett and Japan’s Mitsubishi-UFJ agreed to buy stakes in Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley. Some banks would still not have enough capital, but under Mr Paulson’s original plan, the state could put equity in them, or, if they become insolvent, take them over and run them down.
鲍尔森先生的计划依赖于大量购买有毒债券，其理论依据在于：在任何竞价中，买家数量匮乏会造成价格的暂时性压低，虽然像联邦政府这样的大买家所付出的成交 价格很可能高于现值，但仍然会以易于形成违约的便宜价格购买贷款。此举不仅可以调整一些银行的资本，还可以减少为了调整资产负债比例而搁置的资本。建立可 靠透明的价格将会最终鼓励投资者们重新进入市场并且修复金融体系：本周巴菲特和日本三菱UFJ银行同意购买高盛和摩根斯坦利的股份。一些银行还处于资本不足的状态，但是根据鲍尔森计划的原意，国家可以向银行注资，如果他们出现了清偿问题，政府可以接管银行并阻止其继续恶化。
The economics behind this is sound. Government support to the banking system can break the cycle of panic and pessimism that threatens to suck the economy into deep recession. Intervention may help taxpayers, because they are also employees and consumers. Although $700 billion is a lot—about 6% of GDP—some of it will be earned back and it is small compared with the 16% of GDP that banking crises typically swallow and trivial compared with the Depression, when unemployment surged above 20% (compared with 6% now). Messrs Bernanke and Paulson also have done well by acting quickly: it took seven years for Japan’s regulators to set up a mechanism to take over large broke banks in the 1990s.
支撑该计划的经济形势健康度还算好，政府对于银行系统的支持可以打破人们对经济深陷衰退所产生的恐慌和悲观的恶性循环。政府干预也许会帮到纳税人，因为他 们本身也是雇员和消费者。尽管7000亿美元是一个不小的数目，几乎相当于GDP的6%，但是其中的部分时可以被拿回的，并且与银行危机所吞噬掉的GDP 的16%比较而言就小了很多；如果与上世纪的大萧条相比就更是微不足道了，那时候的失业率飚升到20%，而现在只有6%。鲍尔森和伯南克也做到了该出手时 就出手：日本的立法者在90年代时用了7年时间才建立了接管破产银行的机制。
Could the plan be better structured? Some economists want the state to focus on putting equity into the banks—arguing that it is the best way to address their lack of solvency. In theory you would need to spend less, because a dollar of new equity would support $10 in assets. Yet the banks might not take part until they were on the ropes and, if house prices later fell dramatically more, the value of the banks’ shares would collapse. The threat of the government taking stakes would scare off some private investors. And in the charged atmosphere after this bail-out meddling politicians, as part-owners, would have a tempting lever over the banks.
这个计划得架构是否可以更优化呢？一些经济学家希望政府可以向银行注入更多的资本，因为他们认为这是清偿能力缺乏的最佳解决之道。理论上而言应该减少消 费，因为注资1美元可以支撑10美元的资产。然而银行存在着不撞南墙不回头的心理，那么如果房价随后会更夸张地下跌，银行股票将会彻底崩溃。政府介入行为 所引发的恐慌也许会吓跑部分私人投资者。政客们的干预计划造成了非常紧张的气氛，所以股东们有躲避银行的倾向。
Mr Paulson’s plan also has its shortcomings. He will find it hard to stop sellers from rigging auctions, if only because no two lots of dodgy securities are exactly the same. Taxpayers may thus pay over the odds and banks may be rewarded for their stupidity. Yet these costs seem small against the benefit of putting a floor under the markets. And fine calculations about moral hazard are less pressing when investors are fleeing risk.
鲍尔森先生的计划也有弱点：该计划很难阻止卖方的提价行为，除非有两个完全一样的dodgy securities(这个我没有查到)。纳税人会因为不对等的条件而要支付更多成本，而银行会从他们的愚蠢举动中获利。投资者在规避风险的时候，道德风 险的精准计算就不那么重要了。
If the economics of Mr Paulson’s plan are broadly correct, the politics are fiendish. You are lavishing money on the people who got you into this mess. Sensible intervention cannot even buy long-term relief: the plan cannot stop house prices falling and the bloated financial sector shrinking. Although the economic risk is that the plan fails, the political risk is that the plan succeeds. Voters will scarcely notice a depression that never happened. But even as they lose their houses and their jobs, they will see Wall Street once again making millions.
如果鲍尔森先生计划的经济效果还勉强的话，那么其政治效果就应该算是极差了；因为钱已经挥霍到把你带入混乱的人的身上了。如此理性的干预甚至都不能换来长 期的缓解：该计划不能阻止房价的下跌和过度膨胀金融业的缩水，经济风险在于计划的失败，而政治风险在于计划的成功。选民们不会注意到一个永远不可能发生的 经济衰退，尽管目前失去了房屋和工作，但他们还将看到华尔街的东山再起。
Buckle a little, but do it briefly
政策紧缩一些，而且要快
In retrospect, Mr Paulson made his job harder by misreading the politics. His original plan contained no help for homeowners. And he assumed sweeping powers to spend the cash quickly. He was right to want flexibility to buy a range of assets. But flexibility does not exclude accountability. As complaints mounted, Mr Paulson and Mr Bernanke buckled—agreeing, for instance, to more oversight. Now that Messrs McCain and Obama have returned to Congress to forge a deal, more buckling may be necessary. Ideally, concessions should not outlast the crisis: temporary help for people able to stay in their houses, a brief ban on dividends in financial firms, even another fiscal package. They should not be permanent or so onerous that the programme fails for want of participants—which is why proposed limits on pay are a mistake (see article).
回顾过往，鲍尔森先生对政治的错误解读给自己的工作平添了不少难度。他的计划原本不包括对房屋所有者的救助，并且假想出可以迅速作出支出的强大权利。他对 于购买资产灵活性的需求是正确的，但是灵活性也不能牺牲应有的义务。鉴于抱怨的日益增多，鲍尔森和伯南克决定收紧政策：比如同意加强监管。现在麦凯恩和奥 巴马也同国会达成了进一步收紧政策的共识。在理想主义状态下，让步不会比危机延续更长的时间：暂时帮助人们保住自己的房产，暂时中断金融公司的分红以及其 他一揽子财政措施。但是这不应该是长期行为，而且也不应该太过繁琐，否则就会因为缺乏参与者而导致计划的失败；这就是限定支付额度的错误根源所在。
Mr Paulson’s plan is not perfect. But it is good enough and it is the plan on offer. The prospect of its failure sent credit markets once again veering towards the abyss. Congress should pass it—and soon.
鲍尔森先生的计划并不完美，但已经足够用、并且马上可以用。失败的前景会再一次让信贷市场转向深渊，所以国会应该尽快通过该方案。
译者：Tidehunter
Sep 25th 2008
From The Economist print edition
No government bail-out of the banking system was ever going to be pretty. This one deserves support
政府对银行系统的救助永远不可能完美，但当下的这个理应得到支持。
SAVING the world is a thankless task. The only thing beyond dispute in the $700 billion plan of Hank Paulson, the treasury secretary, and Ben Bernanke, chairman of the Federal Reserve, to stem the financial crisis is that everyone can find something in it to dislike. The left accuses it of ripping off taxpayers to save Wall Street, the right damns it as socialism; economists disparage its technicalities, political scientists its sweeping powers. The administration gave ground to Congress, George Bush delivered a televised appeal and Barack Obama and John McCain suspended the presidential campaign. Even so, as The Economist went to press, the differences remained. There was a chance that Congress would say no.
拯救世界是一个费力不讨好的任务。财长鲍尔森和联储主席伯南克为了阻止金融危机而主张了7000亿美元救助计划，其中只有一点是毋庸置疑的：每个人都能从该计划中挑出些毛病来（不可能让每个人都满意—）。左翼势力控诉该计划无异于抢劫纳税人的钱财去救助华尔街，右翼势力谴责该计划为社会主义运动；经济学家鄙视计划的学术性，政治科学家崇拜它横扫一切的强大威力。执政当局向国会进行了妥协：布什发出了电视呼吁，奥巴马和麦凯恩也暂停了竞选大战。即使如此，经济学人杂志在付印时分歧仍在（还是保留了异见）。国会曾经是有机会拒绝该计划的。
Spending a sum of money that could buy you a war in Iraq should not come easily; and the notion of any bail-out is deeply troubling to any self-respecting capitalist. Against that stand two overriding arguments. First this is a plan that could work (see article). And, second, the potential costs of producing nothing, or too little too slowly, include a financial collapse and a deep recession spilling across the world: those far outweigh any plausible estimate of the bail-out’s cost.
花掉相当于伊战军费规模的一大笔银子不应该如此轻松，况且救助的理念令任何一个有自尊心的资本家都感到非常不安。但针对上述论调有两大主要反对观点：第 一，这是一个可能行之有效的方案；第二，那些毫无效果或者收效甚微的潜在支出已经大大超过了救援计划合理的成本预测，上述支出包括蔓延全球的金融崩溃和经 济萎缩所招致的损失。
Mr Market goes to Congress
让国会来判决市场
America’s financial system has two ailments: it owns a huge amount of toxic securities linked to falling house prices. And it is burdened by losses that leave it short of capital (although the world has capital, not enough has been available to the banks). For over a year, since August 2007, central bankers, principally Mr Bernanke, have been trying to make this toxic debt liquid. But by September 17th, following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and the nationalisation of American International Group earlier that week, the problem started to become one of the system’s solvency too. The market lost faith in a strategy that saved finance one institution at a time. The economy is not healing itself. If credit markets stay blocked, consumers and firms will enter a vicious spiral.
美国金融体系微恙有二：过量持有与狂跌房价相关的有毒债券；损失的负担致使体系内呈现出资本短缺（尽管全球拥有很多资本，但是银行可用部分确严重不足）。 自2007年8月以来的一年时间里，以伯南克为主要代表的央行一直致力于有毒债务的清偿。但截止到9月17日，紧随雷曼兄弟的破产和美国国际集团的国有 化，该难题发展成了金融体系清偿能力的麻烦之一。市场对于采取逐个机构救助的方法来挽救金融体系的策略已经失去了信心，美国经济不可能实现自救。如果信贷 市场依然一片僵局，消费者和公司必将卷入更为凶残的漩涡。
Mr Paulson’s plan relies on buying vast amounts of toxic securities. The theory is that in any auction a huge buyer like the federal government would end up paying more than today’s prices, temporarily depressed by the scarcity of buyers, and still buy the loans cheaply enough to reflect the high chance of a default. That would help recapitalise some banks—which could also set less capital aside against a cleaner balance sheet. And by creating credible, transparent prices, it would at last encourage investors to come in and repair the financial system: this week Warren Buffett and Japan’s Mitsubishi-UFJ agreed to buy stakes in Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley. Some banks would still not have enough capital, but under Mr Paulson’s original plan, the state could put equity in them, or, if they become insolvent, take them over and run them down.
鲍尔森先生的计划依赖于大量购买有毒债券，其理论依据在于：在任何竞价中，买家数量匮乏会造成价格的暂时性压低，虽然像联邦政府这样的大买家所付出的成交 价格很可能高于现值，但仍然会以易于形成违约的便宜价格购买贷款。此举不仅可以调整一些银行的资本，还可以减少为了调整资产负债比例而搁置的资本。建立可 靠透明的价格将会最终鼓励投资者们重新进入市场并且修复金融体系：本周巴菲特和日本三菱UFJ银行同意购买高盛和摩根斯坦利的股份。一些银行还处于资本不足的状态，但是根据鲍尔森计划的原意，国家可以向银行注资，如果他们出现了清偿问题，政府可以接管银行并阻止其继续恶化。
The economics behind this is sound. Government support to the banking system can break the cycle of panic and pessimism that threatens to suck the economy into deep recession. Intervention may help taxpayers, because they are also employees and consumers. Although $700 billion is a lot—about 6% of GDP—some of it will be earned back and it is small compared with the 16% of GDP that banking crises typically swallow and trivial compared with the Depression, when unemployment surged above 20% (compared with 6% now). Messrs Bernanke and Paulson also have done well by acting quickly: it took seven years for Japan’s regulators to set up a mechanism to take over large broke banks in the 1990s.
支撑该计划的经济形势健康度还算好，政府对于银行系统的支持可以打破人们对经济深陷衰退所产生的恐慌和悲观的恶性循环。政府干预也许会帮到纳税人，因为他 们本身也是雇员和消费者。尽管7000亿美元是一个不小的数目，几乎相当于GDP的6%，但是其中的部分时可以被拿回的，并且与银行危机所吞噬掉的GDP 的16%比较而言就小了很多；如果与上世纪的大萧条相比就更是微不足道了，那时候的失业率飚升到20%，而现在只有6%。鲍尔森和伯南克也做到了该出手时 就出手：日本的立法者在90年代时用了7年时间才建立了接管破产银行的机制。
Could the plan be better structured? Some economists want the state to focus on putting equity into the banks—arguing that it is the best way to address their lack of solvency. In theory you would need to spend less, because a dollar of new equity would support $10 in assets. Yet the banks might not take part until they were on the ropes and, if house prices later fell dramatically more, the value of the banks’ shares would collapse. The threat of the government taking stakes would scare off some private investors. And in the charged atmosphere after this bail-out meddling politicians, as part-owners, would have a tempting lever over the banks.
这个计划得架构是否可以更优化呢？一些经济学家希望政府可以向银行注入更多的资本，因为他们认为这是清偿能力缺乏的最佳解决之道。理论上而言应该减少消 费，因为注资1美元可以支撑10美元的资产。然而银行存在着不撞南墙不回头的心理，那么如果房价随后会更夸张地下跌，银行股票将会彻底崩溃。政府介入行为 所引发的恐慌也许会吓跑部分私人投资者。政客们的干预计划造成了非常紧张的气氛，所以股东们有躲避银行的倾向。
Mr Paulson’s plan also has its shortcomings. He will find it hard to stop sellers from rigging auctions, if only because no two lots of dodgy securities are exactly the same. Taxpayers may thus pay over the odds and banks may be rewarded for their stupidity. Yet these costs seem small against the benefit of putting a floor under the markets. And fine calculations about moral hazard are less pressing when investors are fleeing risk.
鲍尔森先生的计划也有弱点：该计划很难阻止卖方的提价行为，除非有两个完全一样的dodgy securities(这个我没有查到)。纳税人会因为不对等的条件而要支付更多成本，而银行会从他们的愚蠢举动中获利。投资者在规避风险的时候，道德风 险的精准计算就不那么重要了。
If the economics of Mr Paulson’s plan are broadly correct, the politics are fiendish. You are lavishing money on the people who got you into this mess. Sensible intervention cannot even buy long-term relief: the plan cannot stop house prices falling and the bloated financial sector shrinking. Although the economic risk is that the plan fails, the political risk is that the plan succeeds. Voters will scarcely notice a depression that never happened. But even as they lose their houses and their jobs, they will see Wall Street once again making millions.
如果鲍尔森先生计划的经济效果还勉强的话，那么其政治效果就应该算是极差了；因为钱已经挥霍到把你带入混乱的人的身上了。如此理性的干预甚至都不能换来长 期的缓解：该计划不能阻止房价的下跌和过度膨胀金融业的缩水，经济风险在于计划的失败，而政治风险在于计划的成功。选民们不会注意到一个永远不可能发生的 经济衰退，尽管目前失去了房屋和工作，但他们还将看到华尔街的东山再起。
Buckle a little, but do it briefly
政策紧缩一些，而且要快
In retrospect, Mr Paulson made his job harder by misreading the politics. His original plan contained no help for homeowners. And he assumed sweeping powers to spend the cash quickly. He was right to want flexibility to buy a range of assets. But flexibility does not exclude accountability. As complaints mounted, Mr Paulson and Mr Bernanke buckled—agreeing, for instance, to more oversight. Now that Messrs McCain and Obama have returned to Congress to forge a deal, more buckling may be necessary. Ideally, concessions should not outlast the crisis: temporary help for people able to stay in their houses, a brief ban on dividends in financial firms, even another fiscal package. They should not be permanent or so onerous that the programme fails for want of participants—which is why proposed limits on pay are a mistake (see article).
回顾过往，鲍尔森先生对政治的错误解读给自己的工作平添了不少难度。他的计划原本不包括对房屋所有者的救助，并且假想出可以迅速作出支出的强大权利。他对 于购买资产灵活性的需求是正确的，但是灵活性也不能牺牲应有的义务。鉴于抱怨的日益增多，鲍尔森和伯南克决定收紧政策：比如同意加强监管。现在麦凯恩和奥 巴马也同国会达成了进一步收紧政策的共识。在理想主义状态下，让步不会比危机延续更长的时间：暂时帮助人们保住自己的房产，暂时中断金融公司的分红以及其 他一揽子财政措施。但是这不应该是长期行为，而且也不应该太过繁琐，否则就会因为缺乏参与者而导致计划的失败；这就是限定支付额度的错误根源所在。
Mr Paulson’s plan is not perfect. But it is good enough and it is the plan on offer. The prospect of its failure sent credit markets once again veering towards the abyss. Congress should pass it—and soon.
鲍尔森先生的计划并不完美，但已经足够用、并且马上可以用。失败的前景会再一次让信贷市场转向深渊，所以国会应该尽快通过该方案。
译者：Tidehunter
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Somalia
索马里
Piracy and much worse
海盗行为和更恶劣的行径
Oct 2nd 2008
From The Economist print edition
What is to be done about the world’s least-governed state?
对于世界上最缺乏管理的国家，我们还能做些什么呢？
THE azure waters at the foot of the Red Sea lapping southwards round the Horn of Africa are now the most dangerous in the world. This year pirates have captured more than 60 ships. Recently a Ukrainian ship carrying 33 tanks was captured by Somali buccaneers (see article). The reason for this swirl of maritime outlawry can be found on the nearest shore, in Somalia.
起源于红海的蔚蓝水域（海水）向南拍击着非洲角——当下全球最为危险的地区。今年海盗已经劫持了超过60条船只，最近一艘载有33辆坦克的乌克兰船只落到了索马里海盗的手里。这个海上非法漩涡的成因可以在最近的陆地上找到，那就是索马里。
Until the world’s most comprehensively failed state acquires the barest modicum of order and government, the seas beside it will be a paradise for pirates and a menace to passengers, crew and cargo, even for ships sailing 300 miles offshore. Yet maritime outrages, though they help remind the world of the disaster that is Somalia, are only one reason to do something about the place. A more important one is that Somalia’s people do not enjoy a scrap of security, let alone any of the material benefits of a modern state. And a final one is that the outside world helped tip Somalia into chaos.
除非这个世界上最最失败的国家出现最低限度的秩序和政府行为，否则其周边海域必将成为海盗的天堂：途经的船员、货物，甚至是离岸300英里的船只都会受到威胁。然而，尽管这些海上暴行已经警醒全世界要小心索马里，但这只是对该地区采取行动的原因之一。更重要的一点是索马里的人们也无法享受到一丝的安全，更不用说现代国家可以提供的任何物质利益。最后一点在于正是外部世界的资助让索马里陷入到如此的混乱中。
The prescriptions for dealing with piracy are simple enough. Governments must co-operate more energetically to face down pirates and, where necessary, blast them out of the water. A coalition of countries already has a naval task-force in the area, mainly to tackle terrorism; its numbers should be bumped up and a sea lane that can be properly monitored should be defined. Ships taking food to Somalia for the UN must have a naval escort. The EU should strengthen its tiny naval cell that co-ordinates air and sea activity. The UN, along with the African Union (AU), should organise a coast guard to watch Somalia’s shore. The Gulf states, in particular Saudi Arabia, should fulfil their vague promises to help pay for Somalia’s recovery.
对付海盗行为的方子其实非常简单：各国政府必须更加积极的通力协作以便降服海盗；并在任何必要的时候把他们轰出水面。一些国家已经在该地区联合组成了旨在 对抗恐怖主义的海军特别部队；参与联盟国家的数量应该更多，以便明确可以良好监管的海上航道。负责向索马里维和部队运送粮食的船只必须得到海军的护送，同 时欧盟应该强化可以协调海空作战的小型作战单位，并且应该联合非盟共同组建守望索马里沿海的海岸警卫队。海湾国家，特别是沙特阿拉伯，因该兑现他们很含糊的充诺：资助索马里的复苏。
But the harder, underlying problem is Somalia itself. With no proper government since 1991, it has been a bloody kaleidoscope of competing clans and fiefs. More than 1m, in a population once around 10m, have fled abroad; this year alone, the UN reckons, some 160,000 have been uprooted from Mogadishu, the capital, which has lost about two-thirds of its inhabitants over the years. The country is too dangerous for foreign charities, diplomats or journalists to function there permanently. Thousands of angry, rootless, young Somalis are proving vulnerable to the attractions of fundamentalist Islam in the guise of al-Qaeda and similar jihadist brands. The cash from piracy is probably fuelling the violence.
但是更难解决的深层次问题是索马里本身：那里自1991年以来就没有过正式政府，一直是血腥（成为了）种族对抗和封地之争的舞台。超过100万的人口为此逃离了家园，而该国的人口数量曾经达到过千万；据联合国预测，仅今年就会有超过16万人举家迁离首都摩加迪沙，那座城市在数年来已经失去了近三分之二的人口。该国对于常驻的外国慈善团体、政治家和记者来说太过危险了。数以千计的索马里青年愤怒而无所寄托，伊斯兰原教旨主义分子打着基地组织以及其他圣战组织的幌子对他们进行诱导，而（后者）这些青年人对诱惑的抵御却表现得极为脆弱。海盗的战利品大概都资助了暴力活动。
In recent times Somalia has known order only briefly, in 2006, when Islamists known as the Islamic Courts Union took over. Unfortunately next-door Ethiopia, egged on by the Americans, intervened to oust them. A “transition federal government” has totally failed to impose itself. A feeble AU force has tried in vain to help. With the UN unable to drum up even half the heralded force supposed to keep the peace in Sudan’s ravaged Darfur region, no one has the guts or cash to send a serious force to bring order, let alone justice, to Somalia.
索马里最近才对秩序有了大致的概念，就在2006年伊斯兰法庭联盟控制该地区的时候。不走运的是他们被邻国埃塞俄比亚赶走了，当然该行动是在美国的怂恿下完成的；于是这个“过度联邦政府”连脚跟都没有站稳就消失了。非盟羸弱的武力救助非常徒劳，联合国在苏丹达尔苏尔地区召集的维和力量还没有达到先前计划的一半；在这种情形下再没有人有胆量和财力向索马里地区部署军队维持秩序，更不要说法制了。
And yet outsiders could still help Somalis to help themselves. A “dialogue” that started in nearby Djibouti between most of the warring factions has been going on intermittently for more than a year; the more moderate Islamists from the Courts Union must be brought in, even if the harder-line affiliates of al-Qaeda cannot be. The UN, Western governments and those in the region have a moral duty not to give up trying to bring Somalis together. Besides, wretched as it is, Somalia can cause a lot of trouble—on land and at sea. It is a disaster that the rest of the world cannot shrug off.
然而外界还是可以帮助索马里人实现自救。交战各方在吉布提进行的“对话”断断续续了一年多的时间；即使基地组织的铁杆盟友不可能被吸收入对话，那么伊斯兰 法庭联盟中的温和派必须被引入。联合国、西方政府和该地区的其他政府具有道德职责：不能放弃保持索马里完整的尝试。另外，索马里如此恶劣的情形可以在陆地 和海洋上造成很多麻烦，因此这是一个全世界都无法置若罔闻的灾难。
译者：Tidehunter
索马里
Piracy and much worse
海盗行为和更恶劣的行径
Oct 2nd 2008
From The Economist print edition
What is to be done about the world’s least-governed state?
对于世界上最缺乏管理的国家，我们还能做些什么呢？
THE azure waters at the foot of the Red Sea lapping southwards round the Horn of Africa are now the most dangerous in the world. This year pirates have captured more than 60 ships. Recently a Ukrainian ship carrying 33 tanks was captured by Somali buccaneers (see article). The reason for this swirl of maritime outlawry can be found on the nearest shore, in Somalia.
起源于红海的蔚蓝水域（海水）向南拍击着非洲角——当下全球最为危险的地区。今年海盗已经劫持了超过60条船只，最近一艘载有33辆坦克的乌克兰船只落到了索马里海盗的手里。这个海上非法漩涡的成因可以在最近的陆地上找到，那就是索马里。
Until the world’s most comprehensively failed state acquires the barest modicum of order and government, the seas beside it will be a paradise for pirates and a menace to passengers, crew and cargo, even for ships sailing 300 miles offshore. Yet maritime outrages, though they help remind the world of the disaster that is Somalia, are only one reason to do something about the place. A more important one is that Somalia’s people do not enjoy a scrap of security, let alone any of the material benefits of a modern state. And a final one is that the outside world helped tip Somalia into chaos.
除非这个世界上最最失败的国家出现最低限度的秩序和政府行为，否则其周边海域必将成为海盗的天堂：途经的船员、货物，甚至是离岸300英里的船只都会受到威胁。然而，尽管这些海上暴行已经警醒全世界要小心索马里，但这只是对该地区采取行动的原因之一。更重要的一点是索马里的人们也无法享受到一丝的安全，更不用说现代国家可以提供的任何物质利益。最后一点在于正是外部世界的资助让索马里陷入到如此的混乱中。
The prescriptions for dealing with piracy are simple enough. Governments must co-operate more energetically to face down pirates and, where necessary, blast them out of the water. A coalition of countries already has a naval task-force in the area, mainly to tackle terrorism; its numbers should be bumped up and a sea lane that can be properly monitored should be defined. Ships taking food to Somalia for the UN must have a naval escort. The EU should strengthen its tiny naval cell that co-ordinates air and sea activity. The UN, along with the African Union (AU), should organise a coast guard to watch Somalia’s shore. The Gulf states, in particular Saudi Arabia, should fulfil their vague promises to help pay for Somalia’s recovery.
对付海盗行为的方子其实非常简单：各国政府必须更加积极的通力协作以便降服海盗；并在任何必要的时候把他们轰出水面。一些国家已经在该地区联合组成了旨在 对抗恐怖主义的海军特别部队；参与联盟国家的数量应该更多，以便明确可以良好监管的海上航道。负责向索马里维和部队运送粮食的船只必须得到海军的护送，同 时欧盟应该强化可以协调海空作战的小型作战单位，并且应该联合非盟共同组建守望索马里沿海的海岸警卫队。海湾国家，特别是沙特阿拉伯，因该兑现他们很含糊的充诺：资助索马里的复苏。
But the harder, underlying problem is Somalia itself. With no proper government since 1991, it has been a bloody kaleidoscope of competing clans and fiefs. More than 1m, in a population once around 10m, have fled abroad; this year alone, the UN reckons, some 160,000 have been uprooted from Mogadishu, the capital, which has lost about two-thirds of its inhabitants over the years. The country is too dangerous for foreign charities, diplomats or journalists to function there permanently. Thousands of angry, rootless, young Somalis are proving vulnerable to the attractions of fundamentalist Islam in the guise of al-Qaeda and similar jihadist brands. The cash from piracy is probably fuelling the violence.
但是更难解决的深层次问题是索马里本身：那里自1991年以来就没有过正式政府，一直是血腥（成为了）种族对抗和封地之争的舞台。超过100万的人口为此逃离了家园，而该国的人口数量曾经达到过千万；据联合国预测，仅今年就会有超过16万人举家迁离首都摩加迪沙，那座城市在数年来已经失去了近三分之二的人口。该国对于常驻的外国慈善团体、政治家和记者来说太过危险了。数以千计的索马里青年愤怒而无所寄托，伊斯兰原教旨主义分子打着基地组织以及其他圣战组织的幌子对他们进行诱导，而（后者）这些青年人对诱惑的抵御却表现得极为脆弱。海盗的战利品大概都资助了暴力活动。
In recent times Somalia has known order only briefly, in 2006, when Islamists known as the Islamic Courts Union took over. Unfortunately next-door Ethiopia, egged on by the Americans, intervened to oust them. A “transition federal government” has totally failed to impose itself. A feeble AU force has tried in vain to help. With the UN unable to drum up even half the heralded force supposed to keep the peace in Sudan’s ravaged Darfur region, no one has the guts or cash to send a serious force to bring order, let alone justice, to Somalia.
索马里最近才对秩序有了大致的概念，就在2006年伊斯兰法庭联盟控制该地区的时候。不走运的是他们被邻国埃塞俄比亚赶走了，当然该行动是在美国的怂恿下完成的；于是这个“过度联邦政府”连脚跟都没有站稳就消失了。非盟羸弱的武力救助非常徒劳，联合国在苏丹达尔苏尔地区召集的维和力量还没有达到先前计划的一半；在这种情形下再没有人有胆量和财力向索马里地区部署军队维持秩序，更不要说法制了。
And yet outsiders could still help Somalis to help themselves. A “dialogue” that started in nearby Djibouti between most of the warring factions has been going on intermittently for more than a year; the more moderate Islamists from the Courts Union must be brought in, even if the harder-line affiliates of al-Qaeda cannot be. The UN, Western governments and those in the region have a moral duty not to give up trying to bring Somalis together. Besides, wretched as it is, Somalia can cause a lot of trouble—on land and at sea. It is a disaster that the rest of the world cannot shrug off.
然而外界还是可以帮助索马里人实现自救。交战各方在吉布提进行的“对话”断断续续了一年多的时间；即使基地组织的铁杆盟友不可能被吸收入对话，那么伊斯兰 法庭联盟中的温和派必须被引入。联合国、西方政府和该地区的其他政府具有道德职责：不能放弃保持索马里完整的尝试。另外，索马里如此恶劣的情形可以在陆地 和海洋上造成很多麻烦，因此这是一个全世界都无法置若罔闻的灾难。
译者：Tidehunter
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Depression index
萧条指数
The D-word
“萧条”的出现频率
Oct 2nd 2008
From Economist.com
Signs of a pending depression? The Economist’s D-word index
《经济学人》提出的萧条指数预示着经济萧条即将来临？
MANY comparisons may be made between the devastation being wrought on America’s financial system today and the Wall Street crash of 1929. One similarity that the world is desperate to avoid is a repeat of the depression of the 1930s. Hopes are pinned on the American bail-out plan that the House of Representatives is set to reconsider on Friday October 3rd. If the fear of depression is anything to go by, the future looks bleak. A survey of newspaper articles over the past two decades shows a sharp spike in mentions of the dreaded D-word, as commentators have started to think the worst. The prognostications may possibly turn out to be true, or perhaps the only thing we have to fear are the fears of journalists themselves.
人们或许将如今美国金融系统遭遇的重创同1929年的华尔街大崩盘做了许多比较。它们有一个相似之处，那就是1930年代经济危机的重复，而这也正是世界所极力避免的。希望都寄托在美国的 救市计划上，众议院将于10月3日周五重新审核该计划。如果用对经济萧条的恐惧作为判断标准的话，前景着实堪忧。对过去20年来新闻报道文章的分析表明， 当评论员们开始对经济状况做最坏打算时，可怕的“萧条”字眼出现频率变高。而目前的萧条指数已经是过去20年来的最高值了。这个预兆可能真的会应验，但或 许记者们自身的恐惧情绪才是唯一应该让我们感到害怕的东西。
萧条指数
The D-word
“萧条”的出现频率
Oct 2nd 2008
From Economist.com
Signs of a pending depression? The Economist’s D-word index
《经济学人》提出的萧条指数预示着经济萧条即将来临？
MANY comparisons may be made between the devastation being wrought on America’s financial system today and the Wall Street crash of 1929. One similarity that the world is desperate to avoid is a repeat of the depression of the 1930s. Hopes are pinned on the American bail-out plan that the House of Representatives is set to reconsider on Friday October 3rd. If the fear of depression is anything to go by, the future looks bleak. A survey of newspaper articles over the past two decades shows a sharp spike in mentions of the dreaded D-word, as commentators have started to think the worst. The prognostications may possibly turn out to be true, or perhaps the only thing we have to fear are the fears of journalists themselves.
人们或许将如今美国金融系统遭遇的重创同1929年的华尔街大崩盘做了许多比较。它们有一个相似之处，那就是1930年代经济危机的重复，而这也正是世界所极力避免的。希望都寄托在美国的 救市计划上，众议院将于10月3日周五重新审核该计划。如果用对经济萧条的恐惧作为判断标准的话，前景着实堪忧。对过去20年来新闻报道文章的分析表明， 当评论员们开始对经济状况做最坏打算时，可怕的“萧条”字眼出现频率变高。而目前的萧条指数已经是过去20年来的最高值了。这个预兆可能真的会应验，但或 许记者们自身的恐惧情绪才是唯一应该让我们感到害怕的东西。
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Some more equal than others
收入平等性的差异
Oct 1st 2008
From Economist.com
Income inequality around the world
世界的收入不平等问题
NOT everyone agrees that income inequality is a problem to be solved. America and Britain are reckoned to have among the greatest inequality, among rich countries, as measured by the Gini coefficient. Such inequality may be associated with certain problems, for example a study produced last year by Unicef, the UN children’s agency, suggested that the two countries have particularly low levels of child wellbeing. For many ordinary Americans and Britons, however, social mobility and getting opportunities to prosper may be more important. Nordic countries, which are the most equal, regularly do well in happiness surveys. The highest levels of inequality are in poor countries, especially in South America and Africa.
并非所有人都认为收入不平等是一个需要解决的问题。按基尼系数计算，美英两国都位于富裕国家里收入差距最大的几个国家之列。收入不平等或许总伴有某些特定问题，比如联合国儿童基金会去年发布的一份研究报告就指出，美英两国的儿童福利水平很低。不过，对许多普通美国人和英国人来说，社会流动性和获得飞黄腾达的机会或许更为重要。在社会幸福调查中，北欧国家一般表现较好，那里是世界上收入最平等的地区。收入最不平等的往往都是贫穷国家，特别是在南美和非洲地区。
注：图中所示不同区域是按基尼系数划分的。
收入平等性的差异
Oct 1st 2008
From Economist.com
Income inequality around the world
世界的收入不平等问题
NOT everyone agrees that income inequality is a problem to be solved. America and Britain are reckoned to have among the greatest inequality, among rich countries, as measured by the Gini coefficient. Such inequality may be associated with certain problems, for example a study produced last year by Unicef, the UN children’s agency, suggested that the two countries have particularly low levels of child wellbeing. For many ordinary Americans and Britons, however, social mobility and getting opportunities to prosper may be more important. Nordic countries, which are the most equal, regularly do well in happiness surveys. The highest levels of inequality are in poor countries, especially in South America and Africa.
并非所有人都认为收入不平等是一个需要解决的问题。按基尼系数计算，美英两国都位于富裕国家里收入差距最大的几个国家之列。收入不平等或许总伴有某些特定问题，比如联合国儿童基金会去年发布的一份研究报告就指出，美英两国的儿童福利水平很低。不过，对许多普通美国人和英国人来说，社会流动性和获得飞黄腾达的机会或许更为重要。在社会幸福调查中，北欧国家一般表现较好，那里是世界上收入最平等的地区。收入最不平等的往往都是贫穷国家，特别是在南美和非洲地区。
注：图中所示不同区域是按基尼系数划分的。
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The secret life of words
词语的秘密生活
Sep 18th 2008
From The Economist print edition
MANY will know that the word “muscle” comes from the Latin for “mouse” (rippling under the skin, so to speak). But what about “chagrin”, derived from the Turkish for roughened leather, or scaly sharkskin. Or “lens” which comes from the Latin “lentil” or “window” meaning “eye of wind” in old Norse? Looked at closely, the language comes apart in images, like those strange paintings by Giuseppe Arcimboldo where heads are made of fruit and vegetables.
很多人知道”肌肉”这个词来自于拉丁语中的”老鼠”（也就是说像老鼠一样在皮肤下滚动）。不过，像”悔恨”这类在土耳其语中表示”满是皱的皮革”或是”鳞状的鲨鱼皮”的词就鲜为人知了。有多少人知道”镜片”是来自于拉丁语中的”小扁豆”还有在古挪威语中”窗户”其实是指”风眼”呢？走近瞧瞧的话，会发现语言的组成是千姿百态的，就像是阿奇姆?波尔多那些奇怪的画一样，画中人物的头都是由水果和蔬菜组成的。（小棉袄语：看过这个大师的画，感觉不舒服极了）
Not that Henry Hitchings’s book is about verbal surrealism. That is an extra pleasure in a book which is really about the way the English language has roamed the world helping itself liberally to words, absorbing them, forgetting where they came from, and moving on with an ever-growing load of exotics, crossbreeds and subtly shaded near-synonyms. It is also about migrations within the language’s own borders, about upward and downward mobility, about words losing their roots, turning up in new surroundings, or lying in wait, like “duvet” which was mentioned by Samuel Johnson, for their moment.
并不是亨利?希秦斯的字典都是关于语言的超现实主义。你在读完这本真正关注英语发展前景的书后会感到额外的愉悦–因为此书强调英语在使其自身不断自由地转变、吸收外来词，忘却来源，演变为不断新增的外来词汇，并且和外来词互相交汇，以至于变为极为相似的同义词。同时此书也关注语言自身的变化，词义的拔高和贬低，失去词根的词，在新环境中改头换面的词，或者等着变化的词，比如”羽毛被褥”这个词塞缪尔?约翰逊在当年就提到过了。
All this is another way of writing history. The Arab etymologies of “saffron”, “crimson” and “sugar” speak of England’s medieval trade with the Arab world. We have “cheque” and “tariff” from this source too, plus “arithmetic” and “algorithm”-just as we have “etch” and “sketch” from the Dutch, musical terms from the Italians and philosophical ones from the Germans. French nuance and finesse are everywhere. At every stage, the book is about people and ideas on the move, about invasion, refugees, immigrants, traders, colonists and explorers.
所有这一切都是另一种书写历史的方式。阿拉伯语源学中的”藏红花色”、”深红色”和”糖果”都是中世纪时期英国与阿拉伯世界进行贸易往来时出现的词汇。”关税”与”计算”此类词汇源于阿拉伯语，而”蚀刻”、”素描”这类绘画词汇源于荷兰语，音乐词汇源于意大利语而哲学词汇源于德语。对法语的借用和引用则在英语中是随处可见。不管什么方面来说，此书都是关于不断进步的人和不断进步的思想，以及于侵略、难民、移民、商人、殖民者和探索者有关的。
This is a huge subject and one that is almost bound to provoke question-marks and explosions in the margins-soon forgotten in the book’s sheer sweep and scale. A balance between straight history and word history is sometimes difficult to strike, though. There is a feeling, occasionally, of being bundled too fast through complex linguistic developments and usages, or of being given interesting slices of history for the sake, after all, of not much more than a “gong” or a “moccasin”. But it is churlish to carp. The author’s zest and grasp are wonderful. He makes you want to check out everything-”carp” and “zest” included. Whatever is hybrid, fluid and unpoliced about English delights him.
这是一个宏大的主题。这个主题几乎必定会让人们质疑与争论不休–然而很快在书中纯粹的叙事推进中被遗忘。然而就一本书而言，如何平衡史料与语言史确有难度。偶尔，此书会给人在繁杂的语言学方面涉入过深的感觉。即使援引了一些有趣的历史素材，也仅仅是为了说明一些无关紧要的词的来历，像”gong（锣）”或”moccasin（鹿皮鞋）”之类（前者源自马来语，后者源自印第安语）。但是有点吹毛求疵了。作者的用意和领会都很到位。他使你想要检查所有的词–也包括”鲤鱼”和”用意”。英语的多源性，灵活性或自由性都会让他感兴趣。
English has never had its Académie Fran?aise, but over the centuries it has not lacked furious defenders against foreign “corruption”. There have been rearguard actions to preserve its “manly” pre-Norman origins, even to reconstruct it along Anglo-Saxon lines: “wheel-saddle” for bicycle, “painlore” for pathology. But the omnivorous beast is rampant still. More people speak it as their second language than as their first. Forget the language of Shakespeare. It’s “Globish” now, the language of aspiration. No one owns it, a cause for despair to some. Mr Hitchings admits to wincing occasionally, but almost on principle he is more cheerful than not.
英语世界里从来没有法兰西学院，但是几个世纪以来，她也从不缺乏愤怒的捍卫者抵抗外来的”腐蚀”。保留”男性化”前罗曼语的争论一直没有停止过，甚至重新构造安哥拉?撒克逊式的英语：将”车轮鞍座”指作”自行车”、”病痛知识”来指”病理学”。然而，杂食性动物都是直立行走的。更多的人将英语当作第二门语言，而不是母语来用。忘掉莎士比亚的语言吧！现在流行”全球性”，这是语言的灵感所在。没有人能够独霸英语，也许这会让有些人失望。希秦斯先生承认有时会有不足，但从英语语言学来说，他是更为高兴的。
译者：小棉袄
词语的秘密生活
Sep 18th 2008
From The Economist print edition
MANY will know that the word “muscle” comes from the Latin for “mouse” (rippling under the skin, so to speak). But what about “chagrin”, derived from the Turkish for roughened leather, or scaly sharkskin. Or “lens” which comes from the Latin “lentil” or “window” meaning “eye of wind” in old Norse? Looked at closely, the language comes apart in images, like those strange paintings by Giuseppe Arcimboldo where heads are made of fruit and vegetables.
很多人知道”肌肉”这个词来自于拉丁语中的”老鼠”（也就是说像老鼠一样在皮肤下滚动）。不过，像”悔恨”这类在土耳其语中表示”满是皱的皮革”或是”鳞状的鲨鱼皮”的词就鲜为人知了。有多少人知道”镜片”是来自于拉丁语中的”小扁豆”还有在古挪威语中”窗户”其实是指”风眼”呢？走近瞧瞧的话，会发现语言的组成是千姿百态的，就像是阿奇姆?波尔多那些奇怪的画一样，画中人物的头都是由水果和蔬菜组成的。（小棉袄语：看过这个大师的画，感觉不舒服极了）
Not that Henry Hitchings’s book is about verbal surrealism. That is an extra pleasure in a book which is really about the way the English language has roamed the world helping itself liberally to words, absorbing them, forgetting where they came from, and moving on with an ever-growing load of exotics, crossbreeds and subtly shaded near-synonyms. It is also about migrations within the language’s own borders, about upward and downward mobility, about words losing their roots, turning up in new surroundings, or lying in wait, like “duvet” which was mentioned by Samuel Johnson, for their moment.
并不是亨利?希秦斯的字典都是关于语言的超现实主义。你在读完这本真正关注英语发展前景的书后会感到额外的愉悦–因为此书强调英语在使其自身不断自由地转变、吸收外来词，忘却来源，演变为不断新增的外来词汇，并且和外来词互相交汇，以至于变为极为相似的同义词。同时此书也关注语言自身的变化，词义的拔高和贬低，失去词根的词，在新环境中改头换面的词，或者等着变化的词，比如”羽毛被褥”这个词塞缪尔?约翰逊在当年就提到过了。
All this is another way of writing history. The Arab etymologies of “saffron”, “crimson” and “sugar” speak of England’s medieval trade with the Arab world. We have “cheque” and “tariff” from this source too, plus “arithmetic” and “algorithm”-just as we have “etch” and “sketch” from the Dutch, musical terms from the Italians and philosophical ones from the Germans. French nuance and finesse are everywhere. At every stage, the book is about people and ideas on the move, about invasion, refugees, immigrants, traders, colonists and explorers.
所有这一切都是另一种书写历史的方式。阿拉伯语源学中的”藏红花色”、”深红色”和”糖果”都是中世纪时期英国与阿拉伯世界进行贸易往来时出现的词汇。”关税”与”计算”此类词汇源于阿拉伯语，而”蚀刻”、”素描”这类绘画词汇源于荷兰语，音乐词汇源于意大利语而哲学词汇源于德语。对法语的借用和引用则在英语中是随处可见。不管什么方面来说，此书都是关于不断进步的人和不断进步的思想，以及于侵略、难民、移民、商人、殖民者和探索者有关的。
This is a huge subject and one that is almost bound to provoke question-marks and explosions in the margins-soon forgotten in the book’s sheer sweep and scale. A balance between straight history and word history is sometimes difficult to strike, though. There is a feeling, occasionally, of being bundled too fast through complex linguistic developments and usages, or of being given interesting slices of history for the sake, after all, of not much more than a “gong” or a “moccasin”. But it is churlish to carp. The author’s zest and grasp are wonderful. He makes you want to check out everything-”carp” and “zest” included. Whatever is hybrid, fluid and unpoliced about English delights him.
这是一个宏大的主题。这个主题几乎必定会让人们质疑与争论不休–然而很快在书中纯粹的叙事推进中被遗忘。然而就一本书而言，如何平衡史料与语言史确有难度。偶尔，此书会给人在繁杂的语言学方面涉入过深的感觉。即使援引了一些有趣的历史素材，也仅仅是为了说明一些无关紧要的词的来历，像”gong（锣）”或”moccasin（鹿皮鞋）”之类（前者源自马来语，后者源自印第安语）。但是有点吹毛求疵了。作者的用意和领会都很到位。他使你想要检查所有的词–也包括”鲤鱼”和”用意”。英语的多源性，灵活性或自由性都会让他感兴趣。
English has never had its Académie Fran?aise, but over the centuries it has not lacked furious defenders against foreign “corruption”. There have been rearguard actions to preserve its “manly” pre-Norman origins, even to reconstruct it along Anglo-Saxon lines: “wheel-saddle” for bicycle, “painlore” for pathology. But the omnivorous beast is rampant still. More people speak it as their second language than as their first. Forget the language of Shakespeare. It’s “Globish” now, the language of aspiration. No one owns it, a cause for despair to some. Mr Hitchings admits to wincing occasionally, but almost on principle he is more cheerful than not.
英语世界里从来没有法兰西学院，但是几个世纪以来，她也从不缺乏愤怒的捍卫者抵抗外来的”腐蚀”。保留”男性化”前罗曼语的争论一直没有停止过，甚至重新构造安哥拉?撒克逊式的英语：将”车轮鞍座”指作”自行车”、”病痛知识”来指”病理学”。然而，杂食性动物都是直立行走的。更多的人将英语当作第二门语言，而不是母语来用。忘掉莎士比亚的语言吧！现在流行”全球性”，这是语言的灵感所在。没有人能够独霸英语，也许这会让有些人失望。希秦斯先生承认有时会有不足，但从英语语言学来说，他是更为高兴的。
译者：小棉袄
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Capital bonanzas
财源滚滚
Sep 25th 2008
From The Economist print edition
Does Wall Street’s meltdown show financial globalisation itself is part of the problem?
这次华尔街的灾难意味着金融全球化本身就是问题的一部分吗？
“THANK God,” said one Latin American finance minister earlier this year. “At least this time it isn’t our fault.”
“谢天谢地，”一位拉丁美洲的财政部长在今年早些时候说，”至少这次不是我们的错。”
The meltdown of America’s financial system may look very different from the emerging-market crises that overwhelmed Thailand in 1997 or Russia in 1998. This time there has been no currency collapse, no government default. Then, there were no collateralised-debt obligations or credit-default swaps.
美国金融体系的灾难跟在1997，98年横扫泰国和俄罗斯的新兴市场危机有所不同。这次没有货币崩溃，没有政府失职。而上次却没有担保抵押债务，或者信用违约互换。
Yet the minister was justified in seeing parallels between America’s crisis and the emerging-market episodes. In all of them vast current-account deficits were financed by huge capital inflows. The afflicted countries saw housing speculation, asset bubbles and cheap loans followed by a credit crunch and the seizing up of the financial system. And Wall Street’s meltdown raises the same questions as the crises of a decade ago: what will the direct effects on emerging markets be? If the world’s richest economies are vulnerable to global financial turmoil, should developing countries not seek to insulate themselves from it?
然而上面那位财政部长将美国的金融危机和新兴市场的金融危机看作一致也是恰如其分的。所有这些国家都以大量的资本流入为经常账户赤字融资。于是这些国家便首先出现房地产投机，资产泡沫和低廉的贷款，随之而来的是信贷紧缩和金融体系的停滞。这让上述国家深受折磨、痛苦不堪。而华尔街的灾难提出了与十年前金融危机相同的问题：这场灾难将会给新兴市场带来什么直接影响？如果世界最富裕的经济体还在全球金融动荡面前还脆弱不堪，为何新兴市场不寻求与之隔绝呢？
Two recent papers* cast light on these questions. They conclude that, although financial globalisation has big costs, these can be minimised and potential gains increased by better policy. Financial globalisation itself, they imply, ought to be seen not so much as a bad thing, but as too much of a good one.
最新的两篇论文（注1）阐明了这些问题。他们的结论是，虽然金融全球化有巨大的成本，但是这些成本可以最小化而潜在的收益可以依靠政策的改善而增加。他们认为，金融全球化本身不应该看作一件坏事，而是一件好事。
Beware markets bearing gifts
当心市场带来的木马
Most emerging markets see their ability to attract foreign money as proof of good management. From this point of view, it should be a blessing that private capital flows to developing countries rose, according to the World Bank, to $1 trillion in 2007, the highest ever. Yet if the study by Carmen and Vincent Reinhart is anything to go by, this should be little cause for celebration.
绝大多数新兴市场将他们吸引外资的能力看作其良好管理的证明。基于这样的观点，根据世界银行数据，2007年流入发展中国家的资金达到有史以来最高的1万亿美元，这应该看作一件非常幸运的事了。然而如果依据Carmen和Vincent Reinhart的研究结论的话，这没什么值得庆贺的。
Taking the experience of 181 countries since 1980, the authors reckon that middle- and low-income countries had a roughly 20% chance of suffering a banking crisis and a 30% chance of a currency crisis, external-debt default or inflation spike (to more than 20% a year) if they experienced what the authors call a “capital-flow bonanza” in the three years beforehand. (They define such a bonanza as an unusual shift of the current account into the red, using that as a proxy for capital inflows since the capital and current accounts mirror each other.) These seem unenviable odds.
根据自1980年以来181个国家的经验，作者认为，如果在之前三年有作者称之为”财源滚滚涌入”（它们将财源滚滚定义为，经常账户异常变为赤字，并且以此作为资金流入的代理，因为资本和经常账户互相反应彼此）的话，中低收入国家有大约20％的可能陷入银行危机，30％的可能陷入货币危机，外债违约和通货暴涨（年度通胀率超过20％）。这显然是不值得羡慕的恩惠。
The authors point out that countries might have suffered disasters anyway, without being showered with money. That turns out to be true-but their chances were quite a bit lower: between 14% and 24% for countries that did not attract so many dollars. In other words, a foreign inflow, as well as financing good things such as public infrastructure and corporate investment, is also associated with debt defaults, inflation and currency crises.
作者指出，上述那样的国家在没有大量资金资助下，肯定会陷入不管何种方式的灾难之中。这被证明是正确的，但是发生的概率比较低–大约只有没有获得巨额外资的国家14％到24％发生灾难的概率。换句话说，外资流入一方面会资助好的项目，例如公共基础设施和公司投资，但另一方面也会与债务违约，通货膨胀和货币危机发生关系。
The authors focus on the level of capital flows, rather than their composition. Presumably, countries that attract more foreign direct investment suffer less than those that have a greater amount of footloose portfolio investment or short-term bank lending. But overall, most countries that suck in foreign money show the classic signs of an economic bubble. Using a subset of 66 countries for which there are more detailed figures, the authors show that share prices rose by more than 10% in real terms in the two years before what they call a bonanza, then fell relentlessly for four years, ending below where they started. House prices went up by more than that-15% in real terms over four years during a bonanza-before falling back.
作者更关注资金流入的数量而不是它们的构成。据估计，有大量外资直接投资的国家会比有大量自由组合投资或者短期银行贷款的国家所承受的风险要少。但是总体来说，绝大多数吸入大量外资的国家显出经济泡沫的典型特征。用66个有更多经济数据的国家作为研究对象，作者发现，在其所谓的引入”财源滚滚”之前两年，这些国家的股票按实值计算增长10％以上，但是在引入”财源滚滚”之后却会连跌四年，最后降到起始点以下。房价涨得更多，在”财源滚滚”的四年内按实际价值计算增长了15％，而之后便会回落。
So why would countries seek out foreign money at all, if its impact is so malign? The answer is that it is not so much the amount of investment that is the trouble; it is its volatility, and especially its tendency to dry up. That makes today’s climate worrying. Mansoor Dailami, the World Bank’s manager of international finance, says private inflows to emerging markets may fall from $1 trillion to only $800 billion-850 billion this year. That may be particularly troublesome because of another difference between this crisis and the Asian one: in 1997-98, more debt was sovereign. Now, much of it is corporate, taken out by Indian, Chinese and other emerging-market companies. That implies a global credit tightening could have as big an impact on emerging markets as slowing import demand in the rich world.
那么即使这么有害，为何这些国家还想积极获取外资呢？因为并不是大量投资是麻烦，而是其波动性，特别是其即将耗尽的趋势。这造成了今天忧虑的气氛。世界银行国际金融经理Mansoor Dailami说，私人资本涌入新兴市场会从1万亿美元下降到今年的8千亿到8千5百亿美元。这是非常糟糕的。因为这场金融危机与上次亚洲金融危机另一个不同之处在于，在1997到98年，更多的债务是政府所有的。而现在，这些大部分是公司所有的，会被印度，中国和其它新兴市场的公司获得。这意味着，全球信贷紧缩对新兴市场的影响与发达国家和地区进口需求放缓对新兴市场的影响一样大。
Critics of financial globalisation argue that these problems are so great that emerging markets ought to be insulating themselves through capital controls. Many have been doing so. Yet even setting aside doubts about how far this is desirable (it is hard to believe growth in India or Brazil would have reached today’s levels without foreign capital), the studies raise questions about whether capital controls are really the right response.
金融全球化的批评者认为，这些问题太大，因此新兴市场国家必须采取资本监管从而使其免遭其害。许多新兴市场国家也就是这么做的。然而即使抛开对资本监管到何种程度合适的质疑（印度和巴西如果没有外资投入的话，其增长率很难能够达到今天的水平），这两篇论文也提出了这个问题：资本监管是否是个正确的应对方法？
The second study points out that “sudden stops” of capital inflows tend to be an inverted U-shape: the poorest countries are the least vulnerable to global financial shocks; middle-income countries are the most; but, as you get richer and more integrated into global finance, your vulnerability tends to fall again-and that remains true despite the crisis in America. So it might still make sense for countries like India and Brazil to carry on liberalising. Moreover, as the Reinharts show, a big part of the problem is that capital flows are endemically boom-bust: money floods in and out. They argue that fiscal policy should be used to smooth out such cycles: governments should reduce deficits or run surpluses during bonanzas-the opposite of what they usually do. This implies something of a paradox. Capital flows are supposed to be a reward for good economic behaviour. But as Dani Rodrik, a Harvard professor, says, “these policy conclusions turn capital inflows into an imperative for even deeper reform.”
第二篇论文指出外资流入”骤停”会对不同经济体产生”倒U”型的影响：最穷的国家最不可能遭受全球金融冲击；中等收入国家最可能遭受冲击；但是随着你更富有更进一步融入全球金融体系，那么遭受冲击的可能性又会再次下降–除了美国的金融危机外，这还是正确的。因此对于像印度和巴西这样的国家来说继续施行自由化政策还是很明智的。此外，如Reinharts所示，最大的问题在于资金流动的地方性兴衰起伏：资金大量涌入、涌出。他们认为金融政策应该缓和这样的起伏周期：政府应该在”财源滚滚”时减少赤字或者增加盈余–而这些政府的做法恰好与之相反。而这却是个悖论。资金流入应该是对一个良好运行经济体的褒奖、但是如同哈佛教授Dani Rodrik所说：”那些政策却将资金流入作为深化改革的必须。”
译者：rushor
财源滚滚
Sep 25th 2008
From The Economist print edition
Does Wall Street’s meltdown show financial globalisation itself is part of the problem?
这次华尔街的灾难意味着金融全球化本身就是问题的一部分吗？
“THANK God,” said one Latin American finance minister earlier this year. “At least this time it isn’t our fault.”
“谢天谢地，”一位拉丁美洲的财政部长在今年早些时候说，”至少这次不是我们的错。”
The meltdown of America’s financial system may look very different from the emerging-market crises that overwhelmed Thailand in 1997 or Russia in 1998. This time there has been no currency collapse, no government default. Then, there were no collateralised-debt obligations or credit-default swaps.
美国金融体系的灾难跟在1997，98年横扫泰国和俄罗斯的新兴市场危机有所不同。这次没有货币崩溃，没有政府失职。而上次却没有担保抵押债务，或者信用违约互换。
Yet the minister was justified in seeing parallels between America’s crisis and the emerging-market episodes. In all of them vast current-account deficits were financed by huge capital inflows. The afflicted countries saw housing speculation, asset bubbles and cheap loans followed by a credit crunch and the seizing up of the financial system. And Wall Street’s meltdown raises the same questions as the crises of a decade ago: what will the direct effects on emerging markets be? If the world’s richest economies are vulnerable to global financial turmoil, should developing countries not seek to insulate themselves from it?
然而上面那位财政部长将美国的金融危机和新兴市场的金融危机看作一致也是恰如其分的。所有这些国家都以大量的资本流入为经常账户赤字融资。于是这些国家便首先出现房地产投机，资产泡沫和低廉的贷款，随之而来的是信贷紧缩和金融体系的停滞。这让上述国家深受折磨、痛苦不堪。而华尔街的灾难提出了与十年前金融危机相同的问题：这场灾难将会给新兴市场带来什么直接影响？如果世界最富裕的经济体还在全球金融动荡面前还脆弱不堪，为何新兴市场不寻求与之隔绝呢？
Two recent papers* cast light on these questions. They conclude that, although financial globalisation has big costs, these can be minimised and potential gains increased by better policy. Financial globalisation itself, they imply, ought to be seen not so much as a bad thing, but as too much of a good one.
最新的两篇论文（注1）阐明了这些问题。他们的结论是，虽然金融全球化有巨大的成本，但是这些成本可以最小化而潜在的收益可以依靠政策的改善而增加。他们认为，金融全球化本身不应该看作一件坏事，而是一件好事。
Beware markets bearing gifts
当心市场带来的木马
Most emerging markets see their ability to attract foreign money as proof of good management. From this point of view, it should be a blessing that private capital flows to developing countries rose, according to the World Bank, to $1 trillion in 2007, the highest ever. Yet if the study by Carmen and Vincent Reinhart is anything to go by, this should be little cause for celebration.
绝大多数新兴市场将他们吸引外资的能力看作其良好管理的证明。基于这样的观点，根据世界银行数据，2007年流入发展中国家的资金达到有史以来最高的1万亿美元，这应该看作一件非常幸运的事了。然而如果依据Carmen和Vincent Reinhart的研究结论的话，这没什么值得庆贺的。
Taking the experience of 181 countries since 1980, the authors reckon that middle- and low-income countries had a roughly 20% chance of suffering a banking crisis and a 30% chance of a currency crisis, external-debt default or inflation spike (to more than 20% a year) if they experienced what the authors call a “capital-flow bonanza” in the three years beforehand. (They define such a bonanza as an unusual shift of the current account into the red, using that as a proxy for capital inflows since the capital and current accounts mirror each other.) These seem unenviable odds.
根据自1980年以来181个国家的经验，作者认为，如果在之前三年有作者称之为”财源滚滚涌入”（它们将财源滚滚定义为，经常账户异常变为赤字，并且以此作为资金流入的代理，因为资本和经常账户互相反应彼此）的话，中低收入国家有大约20％的可能陷入银行危机，30％的可能陷入货币危机，外债违约和通货暴涨（年度通胀率超过20％）。这显然是不值得羡慕的恩惠。
The authors point out that countries might have suffered disasters anyway, without being showered with money. That turns out to be true-but their chances were quite a bit lower: between 14% and 24% for countries that did not attract so many dollars. In other words, a foreign inflow, as well as financing good things such as public infrastructure and corporate investment, is also associated with debt defaults, inflation and currency crises.
作者指出，上述那样的国家在没有大量资金资助下，肯定会陷入不管何种方式的灾难之中。这被证明是正确的，但是发生的概率比较低–大约只有没有获得巨额外资的国家14％到24％发生灾难的概率。换句话说，外资流入一方面会资助好的项目，例如公共基础设施和公司投资，但另一方面也会与债务违约，通货膨胀和货币危机发生关系。
The authors focus on the level of capital flows, rather than their composition. Presumably, countries that attract more foreign direct investment suffer less than those that have a greater amount of footloose portfolio investment or short-term bank lending. But overall, most countries that suck in foreign money show the classic signs of an economic bubble. Using a subset of 66 countries for which there are more detailed figures, the authors show that share prices rose by more than 10% in real terms in the two years before what they call a bonanza, then fell relentlessly for four years, ending below where they started. House prices went up by more than that-15% in real terms over four years during a bonanza-before falling back.
作者更关注资金流入的数量而不是它们的构成。据估计，有大量外资直接投资的国家会比有大量自由组合投资或者短期银行贷款的国家所承受的风险要少。但是总体来说，绝大多数吸入大量外资的国家显出经济泡沫的典型特征。用66个有更多经济数据的国家作为研究对象，作者发现，在其所谓的引入”财源滚滚”之前两年，这些国家的股票按实值计算增长10％以上，但是在引入”财源滚滚”之后却会连跌四年，最后降到起始点以下。房价涨得更多，在”财源滚滚”的四年内按实际价值计算增长了15％，而之后便会回落。
So why would countries seek out foreign money at all, if its impact is so malign? The answer is that it is not so much the amount of investment that is the trouble; it is its volatility, and especially its tendency to dry up. That makes today’s climate worrying. Mansoor Dailami, the World Bank’s manager of international finance, says private inflows to emerging markets may fall from $1 trillion to only $800 billion-850 billion this year. That may be particularly troublesome because of another difference between this crisis and the Asian one: in 1997-98, more debt was sovereign. Now, much of it is corporate, taken out by Indian, Chinese and other emerging-market companies. That implies a global credit tightening could have as big an impact on emerging markets as slowing import demand in the rich world.
那么即使这么有害，为何这些国家还想积极获取外资呢？因为并不是大量投资是麻烦，而是其波动性，特别是其即将耗尽的趋势。这造成了今天忧虑的气氛。世界银行国际金融经理Mansoor Dailami说，私人资本涌入新兴市场会从1万亿美元下降到今年的8千亿到8千5百亿美元。这是非常糟糕的。因为这场金融危机与上次亚洲金融危机另一个不同之处在于，在1997到98年，更多的债务是政府所有的。而现在，这些大部分是公司所有的，会被印度，中国和其它新兴市场的公司获得。这意味着，全球信贷紧缩对新兴市场的影响与发达国家和地区进口需求放缓对新兴市场的影响一样大。
Critics of financial globalisation argue that these problems are so great that emerging markets ought to be insulating themselves through capital controls. Many have been doing so. Yet even setting aside doubts about how far this is desirable (it is hard to believe growth in India or Brazil would have reached today’s levels without foreign capital), the studies raise questions about whether capital controls are really the right response.
金融全球化的批评者认为，这些问题太大，因此新兴市场国家必须采取资本监管从而使其免遭其害。许多新兴市场国家也就是这么做的。然而即使抛开对资本监管到何种程度合适的质疑（印度和巴西如果没有外资投入的话，其增长率很难能够达到今天的水平），这两篇论文也提出了这个问题：资本监管是否是个正确的应对方法？
The second study points out that “sudden stops” of capital inflows tend to be an inverted U-shape: the poorest countries are the least vulnerable to global financial shocks; middle-income countries are the most; but, as you get richer and more integrated into global finance, your vulnerability tends to fall again-and that remains true despite the crisis in America. So it might still make sense for countries like India and Brazil to carry on liberalising. Moreover, as the Reinharts show, a big part of the problem is that capital flows are endemically boom-bust: money floods in and out. They argue that fiscal policy should be used to smooth out such cycles: governments should reduce deficits or run surpluses during bonanzas-the opposite of what they usually do. This implies something of a paradox. Capital flows are supposed to be a reward for good economic behaviour. But as Dani Rodrik, a Harvard professor, says, “these policy conclusions turn capital inflows into an imperative for even deeper reform.”
第二篇论文指出外资流入”骤停”会对不同经济体产生”倒U”型的影响：最穷的国家最不可能遭受全球金融冲击；中等收入国家最可能遭受冲击；但是随着你更富有更进一步融入全球金融体系，那么遭受冲击的可能性又会再次下降–除了美国的金融危机外，这还是正确的。因此对于像印度和巴西这样的国家来说继续施行自由化政策还是很明智的。此外，如Reinharts所示，最大的问题在于资金流动的地方性兴衰起伏：资金大量涌入、涌出。他们认为金融政策应该缓和这样的起伏周期：政府应该在”财源滚滚”时减少赤字或者增加盈余–而这些政府的做法恰好与之相反。而这却是个悖论。资金流入应该是对一个良好运行经济体的褒奖、但是如同哈佛教授Dani Rodrik所说：”那些政策却将资金流入作为深化改革的必须。”
译者：rushor
等级大校
威望22
贴子17028
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注册时间@2013-08-09
Questions of equity
公平问题和股权问题
Sep 25th 2008
From The Economist print edition
Salary caps are a rotten idea; but the crisis also carries lessons for regulators and workers
薪酬限制是个极糟糕的主意；但是这场危机也给监管者和工作者都上了一课
IT IS easy to understand why many in Congress and beyond have demanded salary caps on bank executives as a condition of approving the Bush administration’s bail-out of the financial system. After all, many of the people who will be leading the effort to get the banks back on their feet were the very same masters of the universe whose greed and myopia brought the industry to its knees in the first place. Nonetheless the lawmakers’ apparent decision to impose some form of still unspecified wage limit, a demand reluctantly accepted by Hank Paulson and the Bush administration this week, is a mistake.
为何众多国会议员和广大群众都要求将银行高管的薪酬限制作为批准布什政府金融救援计划的一个条件呢？这个很好理解。毕竟，尽管是这些银行高管将要用他们的力量来帮这些银行摆脱困境，恢复原样。而正是由于这些曾是世界霸主的银行高管的贪婪和短视，首先将整个行业拖入泥淖。尽管如此，立法者这个强制限制薪酬–本周被保尔森和布什政府勉强接受–也是个错误的决定。
Just now, it is a struggle to keep a straight face when you read the words “talent” and “Wall Street” in the same sentence. And yet, precisely because it is in a mess, the financial system will need decent managers if it is to return to the health that benefits the rest of the economy. The sort of sums that would satisfy Congress as a cap may be far above the incomes of average Americans, but there is no surer way of driving finance offshore or into hedge funds where it is beyond the gaze of regulators. Besides, if ever there was a time when pay in banking and broking is likely to be depressed by the market, it is now. The bubble did not only inflate asset prices, it also inflated pay. Now the bubble has burst and hundreds of thousands of finance professionals want work.
刚才，当你在同一个句子里读到”人才”和”华尔街”这些词的时候，会努力控制自己不要笑出声来。可是，恰恰由于其正处困境，金融系统要想恢复健康进而使其余经济部分也从中获益，必须要有优秀的经理人。国会满意的薪酬上限应该比美国人平均收入要高的多，但是并不能保证那些金融资本不会转移到离岸金融公司或者对冲基金，在那里不必担心金融监管者的监视。此外，现在正是银行和经纪业由于市场疲软而薪酬低迷的时候。以前的泡沫不仅膨胀了资产的价格，同时也膨胀了薪酬。现在泡沫破裂了，成千上万的金融专业人士在寻找工作。
American politicians have a lamentable record of intervening in setting executive pay. In the early years of the Clinton administration, Congress imposed a salary cap of $1m, beyond which firms faced a tax penalty. Pay rose, as one set of executives, beneath the cap, realised that they were “underpaid” and another set gained from an outpouring of creativity, as consultants invented myriad option schemes, perks and pension benefits to get around the limit. This only made it harder for shareholders to know who was getting what.
美国政客在干预高管薪酬设定上曾经有段不愉快的历史。在克林顿政府早期，国会将高管薪酬强制定在100万美元，超过这个数字将会受到税收惩罚。于是，对于高管来说有就一套低于那个最高限制薪酬标准。薪酬提高了，一部分高管，意识到薪酬限制让他们受到”剥削”了，而另外一部分人通过创新方式，作为公司顾问发明出诸多的期权计划，补助，养老津贴等等来绕过薪酬限制。这么做的唯一结果就是让股东更难知道那些高管拿多少薪酬了。
If the foolishness of Congress setting corporate pay levels is an old lesson, the financial crisis is teaching some new ones to shareholders. First, forget the received wisdom that paying people in large amounts of shares in their own firm ensures they take sensible value-maximising decisions. In the collapse of Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns, the management did not just take reckless gambles with other people’s money. Dick Fuld and Jimmy Cayne took reckless gambles with their own-and still they failed to do the right things and ended up losing most of their fortunes. Outside shareholders should remember that loading up the people at the top with shares can be an aid to corporate governance, but not a substitute for it.
如果国会愚蠢地设定公司的薪酬是个老教训，那么这场金融危机正在给股东带来一个新的教训。首先，不要相信广为认可的论断–给那些经理人大量本公司的股份就能保证使他们做出利益最大化的决定。在雷曼和贝尔斯登倒台中我们可以看到，那些管理层不仅仅是拿着别人钱的在鲁莽赌徒。迪克福德和杰米凯恩还是拿着自己的钱来鲁莽地下赌注，但最终他们都未能做出正确的抉择从而失掉了其绝大部分的财产。处于管理层外的股东要牢记，给那些管理者以股票只能对其管理有帮助，但是并不能代替公司管理。
Esop’s fables
员工持股的寓言
For employees, the tale of Lehman, especially after Enron, is a reminder of the danger of having too many savings tied up in the firm where you work. More of the truly talented will now demand their bonuses in cash, or perhaps ask for even more shares. That surely will have an effect on the way that firms recruit staff and on employee share-ownership schemes. Paying ordinary workers in shares is expensive-because equity is costly to issue and discounted by employees. And the idea that ordinary workers who own shares in their firm will stop senior managers taking bad decisions has taken another knock.
在安然倒台之后，对雇员来说雷曼事件应该特别引起注意，它提醒雇员不要将自己太多的储蓄和公司绑到一起。许多有才干的雇员从今之后将会要求他们的奖金以现金形式发放，也许或者要求更多的股份。这肯定会对公司招募新员工和员工持股计划产生影响。给普通员工股权会非常昂贵–因为股票发售代价很高，而在员工那里又打折不少。而普通员工持股会阻止高级经理做出错误决定的想法也遭重创。
The structure of bonus schemes is more important than their level-especially in finance. Foolish short-term risk-taking could be discouraged by matching the timing of bankers’ pay to the timing of the risks they are trading. Britain’s Financial Services Authority may ask banks to put up more capital if their pay structures are dangerously risky. That makes far more sense than capping pay. But in the end companies and shareholders are better at setting salaries than bureaucrats.
奖金方案的结构远比其数量更为重要–在金融界尤其如此。根据其对风险的交易时机制定支银行家付薪酬的时机，不失为防止愚蠢的短期冒险行为的良策。英国金融服务当局可能会要求银行持有更多的资金以防薪酬结构改变而带来的风险。这比限制薪酬要有意义的多。但是最终公司和股东会比官僚设定的薪酬要好得多
译者：rushor
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威望22
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注册时间@2013-08-09
And then there were none
投行之死
Sep 24th 2008 | NEW YORK
From Economist.com
What the death of the investment bank means for Wall Street
投资银行模式消失对华尔街来说意味着什么
THE radical overhaul of Britain’s financial sector in 1986 was dubbed the Big Bang. The brutal, unplanned reshaping of Wall Street might be better described as the Big Implosion. As if too ashamed to go on after the humbling of the country’s mortgage agencies and its largest insurer, the “bulge-bracket” brokerage model has collapsed in on itself. Even more humiliating for the erstwhile masters of the universe, the new force in finance is now the government.
1986年英国金融系统的大整顿被称为”金融大爆炸”。而这次对华尔街进行的残酷而又无计划的重塑应该被称为”金融大风暴”。在继美国最大的两家抵押贷款机构和最大的保险商蒙羞受乳之后，华尔街的”顶级投行”的经纪模式也似因连遭重创而无法运行下去，只得轰然垮台。对昔日的世界巨头来说更丢脸的是, 如今金融市场的主导力量变成了美国政府。
The last remaining investment banks, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, were forced to seek sanctuary by converting into bank holding companies after the trampling of Lehman Brothers turned into a full-scale run on the industry. Though neither was particularly sickly, markets could no longer stomach their potentially lethal combination of illiquid assets and skittish wholesale liabilities.
硕果仅存的两家投行–高盛和摩根斯坦利在雷曼垮台后，寻求政府保护：允许其成为银行控股公司从而能在市场上继续保持原有规模运作。尽管二者都不是完全陷入困境，但是市场对于其潜在的致命缺陷–非流动资产和不可靠的大规模债务的模式已经不再信任。
Both will now start gathering large amounts of deposits, a more stable form of funding. Signing up strong partners should also help. Mitsubishi UFJ, a giant Japanese bank, will buy up to 20% of Morgan. Late on Tuesday September 23rd Goldman went one better, coaxing $5 billion from Warren Buffett, an investing legend. This endorsement helped Goldman to raise a further $5 billion in a share offering the next day.
高盛和摩根斯坦利现在会去用吸收大量存款这种稳定的模式来筹资。当然，他们如能和强有力的伙伴合作，那么会对他们筹资有很大帮助。日本银行巨头三菱日联银行会购入摩根斯坦利20％的股份。高盛做的更好，在周二（9月23日）晚些时候，它从传奇投资人物巴菲特那里搞到50亿美元。巴菲特的这个支持有助于高盛第二天从股票发行中再筹得50亿美元。
Mr Buffett, no idle flatterer, describes Goldman as “exceptional”. But some doubt that it can adapt and thrive. As a bank it faces more intrusive supervision from the Federal Reserve, tougher capital requirements and restrictions on investing. Universal banks, such as Citigroup and Bank of America, long dismissed as stodgy, argue that their vast balance sheets and wide range of businesses, from cards to capital markets, give them an edge in trying times. The head of one bank suggests that the golden times enjoyed by investment banks in 2003-06 were an “aberration”, fuelled by a global liquidity glut big enough to hide a multitude of risk-taking sins.
巴菲特先生显然不是无所事事的马屁精，他将高盛描述为”异常出色”。但是有些人怀疑高盛是否能够改革并再次兴盛。作为一个银行它将面临美联储更多的监管，更严格的资本储备率和投资限制。长期以来由于其古板顽固而失宠的综合银行，例如花旗和美国银行，认为他们资产负债表上充足的资本和从银行卡到资本市场广泛的业务，在困难时期给他们带来许多优势。一家银行的老板认为，投资银行在2003到06年间所享受的黄金时光是”不正常的”–由过剩的流动性驱使而来，流动性大到足以掩盖诸多的风险过错。
Private-equity firms and hedge funds spy opportunity. The buyout barons got good news this week, when the Fed relaxed its rules on their ownership of banks. These investors are also going after the investment banks’ “talent”. Hedge funds will be particularly keen to get their hands on cutting-edge risk-takers who fret that new regulation will clip their wings.
私募股权公司和对冲基金正在伺机以动。它们本周得到个好消息，美联储放松了这些收购巨头对银行控股的限制。这些投资者正在追逐投行的”人才”。对冲基金将会对那些担心自己被新规定束缚手脚的精英冒险家们（译者注：投行的人才）表现的格外热情。
Power may shift in two other directions: abroad and, to a lesser extent, to boutique investment banks. Mitsubishi is not the only foreign bank making a move. After a brief wrangle in the bankruptcy courts, Britain’s Barclays has taken over Lehman’s American operations.
权力正在两极分化：一是朝向海外，国际化方向聚集，另一个则是朝向小型专业投行聚集。三菱并不是唯一一个行动的外资银行。在破产法庭上简单争执之后，英国的巴克莱银行收购了雷曼美国的运营部门。
But all is not lost for the former investment banks. For one thing, they may not have to cut leverage by as much as feared. Though their overall leverage ratios are high, their risk-adjusted capital ratios under the Basel 2 rules are stronger than those of most commercial banks.
但是对于原来投行来说并不是所有都失去了。至少，他们不用减掉杠杆像原来担心的那么多。尽管它们的全面杠杆比率很高，但在巴塞尔2协议下，他们的风险调节资本比率比绝大多数商业银行都要好。
Moreover, there are some advantages to becoming a bank now. Dozens of regional lenders are expected to fail in the coming months. Goldman and Morgan should thus be able to amass deposits on the cheap, and without the headaches that would accompany a merger with a big commercial bank. As two of the sharpest distressed-debt investors, they will also be looking to pick up assets from the government’s giant loan-buying entity when it gets going.
此外，现在变为银行还有一些优势。许多地区性商业银行在近期会倒闭。因此，高盛和摩根斯坦利就可以吸收大量便宜的存款，而不必头痛要与一家大型商业银行合并的事情了。作为两家债券严重受损的投资者，它们也同样希望在政府巨大的贷款购买实体成立后，能够回笼些资产。
Given the acute stress in money markets, however, the accent for the time being is more on survival than grabbing opportunities. Banks continue to treat each other with suspicion in interbank loan markets.
由于货币市场有着巨大的压力，现在市场的声音不是能否抓住机会而是能否保住性命了。从银行间拆借市场可以看出银行之间依然存在着巨大的疑虑。
Financial firms fear further fallout from the recent, potentially catastrophic run on money-market funds that prompted the government to step in with guarantees. “Prime” money funds, which are important buyers of corporate debt, remain under pressure and are pulling away from anything deemed risky. This is a big problem for banks, since money funds hold up to $1.3 trillion of their short-term debt. As the funds retreat, the banks will be forced to turn to longer-term (and more expensive) funding markets.
金融公司担心最近在货币市场基金上潜在的灾难会有更严重的辐射影响。这促使美国政府介入市场提供担保。重要的公司债券购买者，”首要”货币基金仍处于压力之下，而且不再涉及任何有风险的债券。这对银行来说是个大问题，因为货币基金只有它们1.3万亿美元的短期债券。随着这些基金的撤退，银行将被迫使用期限更长（且成本更高）的筹资手段。
Once markets stabilise, Wall Street will start to wonder if it is better or worse off without its standalone investment banks. They may leave behind a vacuum. As broker-dealers, regulated more lightly by the Securities and Exchange Commission, they were free to put large dollops of capital to work, providing liquidity, making markets and assuming risk. As banks, they may find the Fed takes a more restrictive view.
一旦市场企稳，华尔街就会考虑缺乏独立投行模式对其有利还是有害。独立投行之死留下了一片真空地带。作为经纪交易商，略受证券交易委员会监管，它们可以自由地运作巨额资本，提供流动性，形成市场并评估风险。作为银行，它们则会发现美联储有着更加限制性的看法。
译者：rushor
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安全的代价
Sep 26th 2008
From Economist.com
How much have previous bail-outs cost?
以前的救市计划花费多少？
CONGRESS is under pressure to approve the Treasury’s proposed $700 billion rescue package. Lawmakers, however, are conscious of the cost to the taxpayer: together with loans to AIG and Bear Stearns, public backing so far approaches 6% of GDP. This is well above the 3.7% of GDP of the savings-and-loan bail-out in the late 1980s and early 1990s. But some 6% of GDP is still much less than the average cost of resolving banking crises around the world in the past three decades, which a study by Luc Laeven and Fabian Valencia, of the IMF, puts at 16%.
目前国会正面临压力，要求它通过财政部提出的7000亿美元的救市计划。不过，立法者们意识到了纳税人需要承担的代价：算上提供给AIG和贝尔斯登的贷 款，目前此次金融危机中的公共支出已经接近GDP的6%。而1980年代末和1990年代初发生储蓄信贷机构危机时，这一数字不过为3.7%。但是，根据 国际货币基金组织Luc Laeven 和 Fabian Valencia的一项研究，过去三十年来世界为解决银行危机的公共支出占GDP的份额平均为16%。6%仍远低于这一平均值。
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America not quite at its best
美国并不在理想状态
Sep 18th 2008
From The Economist print edition
The election has taken a nasty turn. This is mainly the Republicans’ fault
大选开始恶毒了起来，这主要是共和党的错
AS RECENTLY as a few months ago, it seemed possible to hope that this year’s presidential election would be a civilised affair. Barack Obama and John McCain both represent much that is best about their respective parties. Mr Obama is intelligent, inspiring and appears by instinct to be a consensus-seeking pragmatist. John McCain has always stood for limited, principled government, and has distanced himself throughout his career from the religious ideologues that have warped Republicanism. An intelligent debate about issues of the utmost importance-how America should rebuild its standing in the world, how more Americans could share in the proceeds of growth-seemed an attainable proposition.
几个月之前，今年的大选看起来有可能是一场文明的竞赛。巴拉克奥巴马和约翰麦凯恩都代表了他们各自党派最好的一面。奥巴马聪明，有感染力，似乎骨子里就是一个始终寻求共识的实用主义者。麦凯恩一直以来都支持自律的有限政府，并且始终和扭曲共和主义的宗教意识形态人士保持一定距离。他们非常有可能就一些极端重要议题-如何使美国在国际社会中重树形像，如何让更多的美国人共享发展的成果-展开睿智的辩论。
It doesn’t seem so now. In the past two weeks, while banks have tottered and markets reeled, the contending Democrats and Republicans have squabbled and lied rather than debated. Mr McCain’s team has been nastier, accusing Mr Obama of sexism for calling the Republican vice-presidential candidate a pig, when he clearly did no such thing. Much nastier has been the assertion that Mr Obama once backed a bill that would give kindergarten children comprehensive sex education. Again, this was a distortion: the bill Mr Obama backed provided for age-appropriate sex education, and was intended to protect children from sex offenders.
但从现在看来，这种情形不会发生了。在银行和市场都步履维艰的过去两周内，竞争中的民主党和共和党不仅没有展开预期的辩论，反而为一些小事喋喋不休，胡言乱语。麦凯恩团队相对而言更恶劣一些：他们说奥巴马把共和党副总统候选人称为猪，以此指责他有性别歧视，而事实上奥巴马根本没有这么说过。更有甚者他们声称奥巴马曾经支持过一项要求为幼儿园儿童提供全面的性教育的法案。这种说法也是在扭曲事实：奥巴马支持的这个法案要求为儿童提供与其年龄相适的性教育，以保护他们免受性侵犯。
These kinds of slurs seem much more personal, and therefore unpleasant, than the more routine distortions seen on both sides. Team McCain accuses Mr Obama of planning to raise taxes for middle-income Americans (in fact, the Democrat’s plan raises them only for those earning more than $250,000); Mr Obama claims Mr McCain wants to fight in Iraq for 100 years (when the Republican merely agreed that he would gladly keep bases there for that long to help preserve the peace, as in Germany) and caricatures him far too readily as a Bush toady (when Mr McCain’s record as an independent senator has been anything but that).
上述这类攻击比两党常规的歪曲事实的行为更加针对个人，因此也更加让人感觉不快。麦凯恩团队指责奥巴马计划对中产阶级美国人增税（事实上，他的计划只针对那些年收入在25万美元以上的人）；奥巴马声称麦凯恩希望伊战持续100年（而后者只是声称，为了维持伊拉克的和平，他很乐意把美军的军事基地保留足够长时间，就如同在德国一样）；奥巴马还把麦凯恩描绘为布什的翻版（麦凯恩作为一个独立参议员的记录毫无疑问否定了这一点）。
An issue of life and life
生命议题和生命本身
The decision to descend into tactics such as the kindergarten slur shows that America is back in the territory of the “culture wars”, where the battle will be less about policy than about values and moral character. That is partly because Mr Obama’s campaign, perhaps foolishly, chose to make such a big deal of the virtues of their candidate’s character. Most people are more concerned about the alarming state of the economy than anything else; yet the Democrats spent far more time in Denver talking about Mr Obama’s family than his economic policy. The Republicans leapt in, partly because they have a candidate with a still more heroic life story; partly because economics is not Mr McCain’s strongest suit and his fiscal plan is pretty similar to Mr Bush’s; but mostly because painting Mr Obama as an arrogant, elitist, east-coast liberal is an easy way of revving up the Republican Party’s base and what Richard Nixon called the “silent majority” .
共和党采取”幼儿园谣言”这类下三滥的手段说明，美国又开始回到”文化冲突”这条老路上了。在这种情况下，竞选的重点不再是政策而是价值观和道德品质。竞选之所以回到这条路上部分是因为奥巴马的竞选团队，也许是有点愚蠢地，大肆宣传他们的候选人的优点美德。相对其他方面，大部分民众更加关心严峻的经济形势；但民主党在丹佛却把更多的时间用在讲述奥巴马的家庭故事上，而不是宣传其经济政策。共和党也打”文化冲突”牌，部分是因为他们的候选人有一个更加有英雄气概的故事；部分是因为经济并不是麦凯恩的强项，而他的财政计划和布什的极其相似；但最主要的是因为把奥巴马描绘成一个傲慢，精英主义，东岸气息的自由主义者是稳定共和党基础和蛊惑尼克松所称的”沉默的大多数”人士的捷径。
The decision to play this election, like that of 2004, as a fresh instalment of the culture wars is disappointing to those who thought Mr McCain was more principled than that. By choosing Sarah Palin as his running-mate he made a cynical tryst with a party base that he has never much liked and that has never much liked him. Mr McCain’s whole candidacy rests on his assertion that these are perilous times that require a strong and experienced commander-in-chief; but he has chosen, as the person who may be a 72-year-old heartbeat away from the presidency, someone who demonstrably knows very little about international affairs or the economy.
像2004年一样，今年的大选再一次大打”文化”牌，让那些原以为麦凯恩比布什更加自律的人大失所望。通过选择萨拉佩琳作为竞选伙伴，麦凯恩与原来那些他不怎么喜欢并且也不怎么喜欢他的共和党基础人士达成了妥协。麦凯恩的整个竞选活动基于这样一个理念：现在是一个危机四伏的时代，美国需要有一个强力的，有经验的三军统帅；但他却像一个远离政治的72岁老人一样，选择了佩琳这位大家公认对国际事务和经济问题都不怎么了解的人。
What Mrs Palin does do, as a committed pro-lifer, is to ensure that the evangelical wing of the Republican party will turn out in their multitudes. Mr McCain has thus placed abortion, the most divisive cultural issue in America, at the centre of his campaign. His defenders claim that it is too big an issue to be ignored, that he has always opposed abortion, that culture wars are an inevitable part of American elections, and that it was only when he appointed Mrs Palin that the American public started to listen to him. All this is true: but the old Mr McCain, who derided the religious right as “agents of intolerance”, would not have stooped to that.
佩琳所能够做的是，作为一个忠实的反堕胎人士，她能够确保共和党内的绝大多数福音教派人士积极投票。麦凯恩也因此把堕胎这个美国最具争议性的文化议题，置于竞选的核心地位。他的支持者们声称：这个议题非常重要，因而不能被轻易忽略过去；麦凯恩一直以来反对堕胎；文化冲突是美国竞选不可避免的一部分；只有在他选择佩琳以后，美国才开始倾听他的想法。这些都是真的：但是曾经嘲笑宗教右派为”不容异见者”代言人的老麦凯恩，不应该堕落成现在这样。
译者：xsj191
美国并不在理想状态
Sep 18th 2008
From The Economist print edition
The election has taken a nasty turn. This is mainly the Republicans’ fault
大选开始恶毒了起来，这主要是共和党的错
AS RECENTLY as a few months ago, it seemed possible to hope that this year’s presidential election would be a civilised affair. Barack Obama and John McCain both represent much that is best about their respective parties. Mr Obama is intelligent, inspiring and appears by instinct to be a consensus-seeking pragmatist. John McCain has always stood for limited, principled government, and has distanced himself throughout his career from the religious ideologues that have warped Republicanism. An intelligent debate about issues of the utmost importance-how America should rebuild its standing in the world, how more Americans could share in the proceeds of growth-seemed an attainable proposition.
几个月之前，今年的大选看起来有可能是一场文明的竞赛。巴拉克奥巴马和约翰麦凯恩都代表了他们各自党派最好的一面。奥巴马聪明，有感染力，似乎骨子里就是一个始终寻求共识的实用主义者。麦凯恩一直以来都支持自律的有限政府，并且始终和扭曲共和主义的宗教意识形态人士保持一定距离。他们非常有可能就一些极端重要议题-如何使美国在国际社会中重树形像，如何让更多的美国人共享发展的成果-展开睿智的辩论。
It doesn’t seem so now. In the past two weeks, while banks have tottered and markets reeled, the contending Democrats and Republicans have squabbled and lied rather than debated. Mr McCain’s team has been nastier, accusing Mr Obama of sexism for calling the Republican vice-presidential candidate a pig, when he clearly did no such thing. Much nastier has been the assertion that Mr Obama once backed a bill that would give kindergarten children comprehensive sex education. Again, this was a distortion: the bill Mr Obama backed provided for age-appropriate sex education, and was intended to protect children from sex offenders.
但从现在看来，这种情形不会发生了。在银行和市场都步履维艰的过去两周内，竞争中的民主党和共和党不仅没有展开预期的辩论，反而为一些小事喋喋不休，胡言乱语。麦凯恩团队相对而言更恶劣一些：他们说奥巴马把共和党副总统候选人称为猪，以此指责他有性别歧视，而事实上奥巴马根本没有这么说过。更有甚者他们声称奥巴马曾经支持过一项要求为幼儿园儿童提供全面的性教育的法案。这种说法也是在扭曲事实：奥巴马支持的这个法案要求为儿童提供与其年龄相适的性教育，以保护他们免受性侵犯。
These kinds of slurs seem much more personal, and therefore unpleasant, than the more routine distortions seen on both sides. Team McCain accuses Mr Obama of planning to raise taxes for middle-income Americans (in fact, the Democrat’s plan raises them only for those earning more than $250,000); Mr Obama claims Mr McCain wants to fight in Iraq for 100 years (when the Republican merely agreed that he would gladly keep bases there for that long to help preserve the peace, as in Germany) and caricatures him far too readily as a Bush toady (when Mr McCain’s record as an independent senator has been anything but that).
上述这类攻击比两党常规的歪曲事实的行为更加针对个人，因此也更加让人感觉不快。麦凯恩团队指责奥巴马计划对中产阶级美国人增税（事实上，他的计划只针对那些年收入在25万美元以上的人）；奥巴马声称麦凯恩希望伊战持续100年（而后者只是声称，为了维持伊拉克的和平，他很乐意把美军的军事基地保留足够长时间，就如同在德国一样）；奥巴马还把麦凯恩描绘为布什的翻版（麦凯恩作为一个独立参议员的记录毫无疑问否定了这一点）。
An issue of life and life
生命议题和生命本身
The decision to descend into tactics such as the kindergarten slur shows that America is back in the territory of the “culture wars”, where the battle will be less about policy than about values and moral character. That is partly because Mr Obama’s campaign, perhaps foolishly, chose to make such a big deal of the virtues of their candidate’s character. Most people are more concerned about the alarming state of the economy than anything else; yet the Democrats spent far more time in Denver talking about Mr Obama’s family than his economic policy. The Republicans leapt in, partly because they have a candidate with a still more heroic life story; partly because economics is not Mr McCain’s strongest suit and his fiscal plan is pretty similar to Mr Bush’s; but mostly because painting Mr Obama as an arrogant, elitist, east-coast liberal is an easy way of revving up the Republican Party’s base and what Richard Nixon called the “silent majority” .
共和党采取”幼儿园谣言”这类下三滥的手段说明，美国又开始回到”文化冲突”这条老路上了。在这种情况下，竞选的重点不再是政策而是价值观和道德品质。竞选之所以回到这条路上部分是因为奥巴马的竞选团队，也许是有点愚蠢地，大肆宣传他们的候选人的优点美德。相对其他方面，大部分民众更加关心严峻的经济形势；但民主党在丹佛却把更多的时间用在讲述奥巴马的家庭故事上，而不是宣传其经济政策。共和党也打”文化冲突”牌，部分是因为他们的候选人有一个更加有英雄气概的故事；部分是因为经济并不是麦凯恩的强项，而他的财政计划和布什的极其相似；但最主要的是因为把奥巴马描绘成一个傲慢，精英主义，东岸气息的自由主义者是稳定共和党基础和蛊惑尼克松所称的”沉默的大多数”人士的捷径。
The decision to play this election, like that of 2004, as a fresh instalment of the culture wars is disappointing to those who thought Mr McCain was more principled than that. By choosing Sarah Palin as his running-mate he made a cynical tryst with a party base that he has never much liked and that has never much liked him. Mr McCain’s whole candidacy rests on his assertion that these are perilous times that require a strong and experienced commander-in-chief; but he has chosen, as the person who may be a 72-year-old heartbeat away from the presidency, someone who demonstrably knows very little about international affairs or the economy.
像2004年一样，今年的大选再一次大打”文化”牌，让那些原以为麦凯恩比布什更加自律的人大失所望。通过选择萨拉佩琳作为竞选伙伴，麦凯恩与原来那些他不怎么喜欢并且也不怎么喜欢他的共和党基础人士达成了妥协。麦凯恩的整个竞选活动基于这样一个理念：现在是一个危机四伏的时代，美国需要有一个强力的，有经验的三军统帅；但他却像一个远离政治的72岁老人一样，选择了佩琳这位大家公认对国际事务和经济问题都不怎么了解的人。
What Mrs Palin does do, as a committed pro-lifer, is to ensure that the evangelical wing of the Republican party will turn out in their multitudes. Mr McCain has thus placed abortion, the most divisive cultural issue in America, at the centre of his campaign. His defenders claim that it is too big an issue to be ignored, that he has always opposed abortion, that culture wars are an inevitable part of American elections, and that it was only when he appointed Mrs Palin that the American public started to listen to him. All this is true: but the old Mr McCain, who derided the religious right as “agents of intolerance”, would not have stooped to that.
佩琳所能够做的是，作为一个忠实的反堕胎人士，她能够确保共和党内的绝大多数福音教派人士积极投票。麦凯恩也因此把堕胎这个美国最具争议性的文化议题，置于竞选的核心地位。他的支持者们声称：这个议题非常重要，因而不能被轻易忽略过去；麦凯恩一直以来反对堕胎；文化冲突是美国竞选不可避免的一部分；只有在他选择佩琳以后，美国才开始倾听他的想法。这些都是真的：但是曾经嘲笑宗教右派为”不容异见者”代言人的老麦凯恩，不应该堕落成现在这样。
译者：xsj191
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